Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The relevant facts and procedural history of the case can be summarized as follows. On February 26, , the defendant exercised its eminent domain authority over the property at 65 South Main Street. An action to determine the value of the condemned property followed.
During the course of the action, the plaintiff twice attempted to amend his pleadings to reflect the loss in value of 70 South Main Street resulting from the taking of 65 South Main Street. In both instances, the defendant objected to the amendments. Ultimately, the court sustained the defendant's objections and did not allow the amendments.
After a trial to determine the value of 65 South Main Street, the court, in its memorandum of decision dated January 27, , ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff the difference between the fair market value that the court calculated and the amount initially paid to the plaintiff, plus interest.
In addition to the previously described condemnation proceeding, the plaintiff simultaneously pursued the present inverse condemnation action 2 regarding the property at 70 South Main Street. The plaintiff filed his complaint in this action on November 17, , shortly after the court denied his second attempt to amend his pleadings in the eminent domain proceeding.
The defendant moved for summary judgment in the inverse condemnation action on March 4, Because the eminent domain proceeding had concluded and resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had received just compensation for the taking of 65 South Main Street and, therefore, could not pursue an inverse condemnation action.
The court denied this motion on May 11, , and the defendant appealed on May 27, The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plato Associates, LLC v. Environmental Compliance Services, Inc. Furthermore, "[t]he applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, like the applicability of the closely related doctrine of res judicata, presents a question of law that we review de novo.
Groton, Conn. Therefore, we review all of the claims made by the defendant in support of summary judgment de novo. The defendant first contends that summary judgment is appropriate because the plaintiff's inverse condemnation action is barred by the existence of a judgment in the related eminent domain proceeding. The defendant grounds this assertion in the concept of just compensation. According to the defendant, just compensation for the taking of 65 South Main Street was litigated adequately during the eminent domain proceeding.
Any diminution in value of 70 South Main Street as a result of the taking of 65 South Main Street, the defendant argues, should have been litigated in the eminent domain proceeding because it merely reflects another aspect of just compensation for the taking of 65 South Main Street.
The defendant, therefore, asserts that if the plaintiff felt that he had suffered damages that were not reflected in the judgment in the eminent domain proceeding, he should have appealed that decision—not pursued a separate action. We disagree. In support of its argument, the defendant relies on Claud-Chambers v. West Haven, 79 Conn. In that case, the plaintiffs initiated an inverse condemnation action relating to property once owned by them that had been taken by eminent domain.
We affirmed the court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant, noting that "[a]n inverse condemnation proceeding is a remedy to be used only when the governmental authority has not exercised its right to eminent domain.
In coming to this conclusion, we relied on an earlier case from this court, Russo v. East Hartford, 4 Conn. In Russo, the plaintiffs brought an inverse condemnation action after they unsuccessfully asserted in an earlier condemnation proceeding that the value they received for the condemned property did not amount to just compensation.
On appeal, we held that the plaintiffs were barred from bringing the inverse condemnation claim, explaining that "[w]hat the plaintiffs seek in this case is what they already sought, unsuccessfully, in [the eminent domain proceeding]. The defendant's reliance on Claud-Chambers and Russo is misplaced. In both of these cases, the eminent domain proceeding and the inverse condemnation action involved the same property.
Unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, the plaintiff in the present case never initiated an eminent domain proceeding for 70 South Main Street because 70 South Main Street was not taken by eminent domain—only 65 South Main Street was. The plaintiff's inverse condemnation claim involves a different property than that which the defendant condemned through its eminent domain authority.
This fact distinguishes this case from both Claud-Chambers and Russo. Nevertheless, the defendant argues that the plaintiff is in effect seeking what he already sought in the eminent domain proceeding: just compensation for the taking of 65 South Main Street. In other words, the defendant asserts that any loss in value of 70 South Main Street is just another injury suffered as a result of the taking of 65 South Main Street, so the plaintiff's only opportunity for redress was in the eminent domain proceeding.
We do not agree with this extension of Claud-Chambers and Russo. Those cases spoke to a different issue than is presented in this case. Specifically, those cases addressed whether a plaintiff can seek damages in an inverse condemnation action for property that has been condemned.
As the present case involves an inverse condemnation action regarding property that has not been condemned, the defendant's attempts to invoke Claud-Chambers and Russo are unavailing.
The defendant also argues that the plaintiff's inverse condemnation action violates the rule against double recovery. General correspondence, intelligence reports, and patrol reports, 2d Marine Brigade, ; and correspondence of the brigade Intelligence Office B-2 , , and Operations Office B-3 , Intelligence reports, , and other records, , of the 5th Marine Regiment; and records of its 1st and 3d Battalions, Reports from Marine units in Nicaragua, Textual Records: Records of detachments aboard coastal vessels in Florida, , and aboard U.
Preble , Records of the marine guard on U. Guerriere , Letters sent and received by the marine guard at the Paris Exposition, Records of U. Marines in Cuba, , , Letters sent and received, Marine Provisional Battalion, U.
Dixie , Morning reports of the Panama Battalion, Records of Marine Corps companies, Guam, General correspondence of the marine detachment at the American legation in Peiping, Thomas, VI, Textual Records: Records of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, including general correspondence, ; and "geographical" operation file "Area File" , Geographical and subject files of the 2d Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, General correspondence, 1st-6th Marine Divisions, Organization records of ground combat units, Correspondence and reports of Headquarters, 2d Marine Division, Correspondence of the 1st, 3d, and 10th Marine Defense Battalions, Issuances, , and correspondence, 19, of the 5th Marine Regiment.
Administrative records of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Aircraft action reports of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Records of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, consisting of correspondence and reports, ; and administrative file, issuances, and miscellaneous personnel reports, Maps: World War I published topographic maps of France and Germany, annotated to show operations of the 4th Marine Infantry Brigade, items. Airfields in the Western Pacific Ocean, 1 item.
Marine Corps School maps of the Battle of Gettysburg, 1 item. Strategic map of the Pacific Ocean, 1 item. Manuscript and published maps and plans, relating to the Azores, 1 item ; Caribbean, , , and n. Finding Aids: Charlotte M. Ashby, comp.
Unedited documentary black and white and color film footage from the U. Marine Corps Motion Picture and Television Archives, Quantico, VA, of significant activities of the Marine Corps, including combat footage from World War II and Korea, aviation, amphibious landings, and important military leaders, 2, reels ; with supporting documentation 5 rolls of microfilm and 15, microfiche.
Marine Corps recruiting broadcasts, 5 items. Audio tapes of radio program "Marine Diary," 93 items. Photographs , images :History and activities of the Marine Corps, G, 16, images; EX, 30 images , including photographs of artwork depicting events dating back to Commandants of the Marine Corps, PC, 15 images , including photographs of portraits dating back to Marine officers, PG, 80 images , including photographs of portraits dating back to Presidential administrations from Theodore Roosevelt to Lyndon B.
Johnson, PR, 1, images , including photographs of portraits of earlier presidents dating from Marines and government officials, ; landing fields in Haiti and Santo Domingo, , and the 3d Marine Brigade in China, M, images. Marine activities in Nicaragua, NP, 97 images. Marine aviators and aircraft, MA, 25 images. South Main Street. In both instances, the defendant objected to the amendments.
Ultimately, the court sustained the defendant's objections and did not allow the amendments. After a trial to determine the value of 65 South Main Street, the court, in its memorandum of decision dated January 27, , ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff the difference between the fair market value that the court calculated and the amount initially paid to the plaintiff, plus interest. In addition to the previously described condemnation proceeding, the plaintiff simultaneously pursued the present inverse condemnation action 2 regarding the [ Conn.
The plaintiff filed his complaint in this action on November 17, , shortly after the court denied his second attempt to amend his pleadings in the eminent domain proceeding. The defendant moved for summary judgment in the inverse condemnation action on March 4, Because the eminent domain proceeding had concluded and resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had received just compensation for the taking of 65 South Main Street and, therefore, could not pursue an inverse condemnation action.
The court denied this motion on May 11, , and the defendant appealed on May 27, The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plato Associates, LLC v. Environmental Compliance Services, Inc. Groton, Conn. Therefore, we review all of the claims made by the defendant in support of summary judgment de novo.
The defendant first contends that summary judgment is appropriate because the plaintiff's inverse condemnation action is barred by the existence of a judgment in the related eminent domain proceeding. The defendant grounds this assertion in the concept of just compensation. According to the defendant, just compensation for the taking of 65 South Main Street was litigated adequately during the eminent domain proceeding. Any diminution in value of 70 South Main Street as a result of the taking of 65 South Main Street, the defendant argues, should have been litigated in the eminent domain proceeding because it merely reflects another aspect of just compensation for the taking of 65 South Main Street.
The defendant, therefore, asserts that if the plaintiff felt that he had suffered damages that were not reflected in the judgment in the eminent domain proceeding, he should have appealed that decision— not pursued a separate action. We disagree. In support of its argument, the defendant relies on [ Conn. West Haven, 79 Conn. In that case, the plaintiffs initiated an inverse condemnation action relating to property once owned by them that had been taken by eminent domain.
We affirmed the court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant, noting that " [a]n inverse condemnation proceeding is a remedy to be used only when the governmental authority has not exercised its right to eminent domain.
In coming to this conclusion, we relied on an earlier case from this court, Russo v. East Hartford, 4 Conn. In Russo, the plaintiffs brought an inverse condemnation action after they unsuccessfully asserted in an earlier condemnation proceeding that the value they received for the condemned property did not amount to just compensation. On appeal, we held that the plaintiffs were barred from bringing the inverse condemnation claim, explaining that " [w]hat the plaintiffs seek in this case is what they already sought, unsuccessfully, in [the eminent domain proceeding].
The defendant's reliance on Claud-Chambers and Russo is misplaced. In both of these cases, the eminent domain proceeding and the inverse condemnation action involved the same property.
Unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, the plaintiff in the present case never initiated an eminent domain proceeding for 70 South Main Street because 70 South Main Street was not taken by eminent domain— only 65 South Main Street was. The plaintiff's inverse condemnation claim involves a different property than that which the defendant condemned through its eminent domain authority. This fact distinguishes this case from both Claud-Chambers and Russo.
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